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Questo articolo analizza la rappresentazione del periodo fascista nella 
cinematografia italiana e dimostra la necessità di una sua riconsiderazione in 
chiave storica. Il pezzo parte da recenti film cosiddetti revisionisti e li pone nel 
contesto dell’uso politico del film storico nell’Italia del dopoguerra. 
Interrogando i punti di contatto di rappresentazioni del ventennio di opposta 
matrice ideologica, e in particolare il comune debito verso il mito degli italiani 
brava gente, l’articolo sostiene la necessità di superare un dibattito incentrato 
sullo sterile dualismo tra ortodossia e revisionismo per raggiungere una più 
completa visione delle memorie del periodo fascista e della loro trasmissione 
attraverso il mezzo cinematografico. 
 
 
Since 1945, a qualified consensus has existed around a specific 
version of Italy’s fascist period, one which marginalised fascism and 
its popularity while simultaneously, and not without both reason and 
reasons, highlighting the role of the Resistance. As shown most 
recently by John Foot, that consensus is now gone, making way for a 
wider acknowledgment of the plurality of experiences connected to 
the period between 1922 and 1945 (Foot, 2009). On the one hand, this 
more complex understanding of Italy’s past is a cause of some relief in 
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all those who wish to acknowledge and study the contested memories 
of that period; on the other hand, it is a cause of great dismay to those, 
often the same people, who look with concern at the tendency to 
award – out of political design, conformism or intellectual laziness – 
the same political and moral legitimacy to the experiences and choices 
of both sides, fascists and anti-fascists. At least since the emergence of 
the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (AN) as a government partner in 
1994, the political arena has paid the commemoration and 
interpretation of World War II a degree of attention that probably 
surpasses any popular interest in the subject. Fascism and anti-fascism, 
their historical role and present incarnations, certainly played a part in 
the 1994 and 1996 elections, while until the new century AN’s leader 
Gianfranco Fini has been at pains to distance his party from its 
extremist roots. Silvio Berlusconi himself has adopted a 
historiographically preposterous, but politically successful, long-term 
strategy, which places Italian fascism and Italian communism on the 
same level, while simultaneously presenting fascism as the ancient 
past and communism as an ever-present danger. In response, Italy’s 
centre-left coalitions have, as in almost all other regards, chased 
Berlusconi’s agenda; unable to celebrate and advocate the key role of 
the Italian Communist Party (PCI) first in the establishment, then in 
the consolidation and finally in the survival of democracy in the 
peninsula, the left, in its many incarnations, has instead stumbled 
along unsure between celebrating their own antifascist roots and 
rejecting all totalitarian ideologies. 
In practical terms, this struggle has been fought on issues as wide-
ranging as participation in official commemorations such as the 25 
April demonstrations, the establishment of memorial days for the 
victims of the Holocaust and of the foibe1, the selection of history 
textbooks in schools and the naming of city streets, among others 
                                               
1
  The word foibe refers to fissures that occur naturally in the karstic terrain of the Carso 
region, spanning the border between Italy and Slovenia. The Italian word has become 
synonymous with the massacres of thousands of ethnic Italians shot and disposed of in the 




(Clifford, 2008). Not the least of the national memory’s battlegrounds 
has been popular culture and, in particular, cinema and television 
(Ferrero-Regis, 2009:116-136). Here, a number of historical films on 
World War II, part-funded by the state television RAI and intended for 
television broadcast over two evenings, appear to have led a concerted 
effort to rediscover marginalised experiences of the war, celebrate 
new Italian heroes and question the morality of the Resistance. These 
works have attracted little or no academic attention and often a 
dismissive critique in the Italian media, even when they have 
commanded wide television audiences. And yet the films themselves, 
their commissioning, broadcasting and reception, pose a number of 
questions which need answering. At the same time, they point towards 
the need to reconsider more widely the representation of fascism in 
Italian cinema and television.  
This article sets out the rationale and the need for such 
reconsideration, aimed at placing contemporary filmmaking about 
World War II into the context of sixty-five years of political use of the 
historical film in Italy. Questioning the points of contact between 
opposing ideological representations of wartime Italy, it argues the 
need to move beyond the orthodox-revisionist debate and towards a 
fuller acknowledgment of the complexities of Italy’s memories of the 
war and their transmission through film. 
 
World War II as national trauma 
 
As many scholars have shown, Italians have historically privileged a 
view of their fascist past which extolled Italian resistance to fascism – 
in fact a minoritarian and therefore even more praiseworthy 
experience – and caricatured a set of national characteristics that have 
become inextricably linked to the fascist period (Gundle, 2000; 
Pezzino, 2005). Although it has many incarnations and shades, this 
well-worn view can be summarised simplistically thus: Italians have 
always been selfish, in a Guicciardinian sense, both noble and 
perfidious; lazy, indifferent to politics, conformist to the point of 
cowardice, they were well suited to accepting the rule of a basically 
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paternalistic dictatorship whose totalitarian ambitions were 
subordinated, arguably deliberately, to a pragmatic cultivation of 
consensus which in many ways allowed Italy’s familistic survivalism 
to continue unaltered. Slow to anger – the story continues – Italians 
finally reacted as Mussolini’s regime turned inwardly and outwardly 
aggressive by sanctioning the alliance with Germany, issuing the 
racial laws and declaring war on France and Britain in 1940. 
Unaccustomed to any sense of civic responsibilities, the population 
was nevertheless steeped in communitarian values fostered by Latin 
solidarity, an atavistic parochialism and deeply felt Christian values, 
and thus reacted against the senseless bloodshed. As it is often 
summed up: italiani brava gente. 
While there may be some truth to this stereotype, it was 
nevertheless the result of abundant simplification and often wilful 
disregard of key aspects of the fascist period, such as the level of 
popular support for the conflict in Ethiopia. Fostered by both popular 
and institutional reconstructions, this version of events proved both 
successful and useful: it helped Italy recover its national pride and 
negotiate a more generous settlement in the post-war world order; its 
implications were the underestimation of fascism and the restoration 
of national innocence by pitching Italy as a victim first of an 
unpopular dictatorship, and then of a cruel German occupation. By 
extension, the restoration and exaltation of Italy’s antifascist 
credentials acquitted the State from its worst crimes, in Ethiopia and 
other occupied territories, or at home against Jews and ethnic 
minorities. The pragmatic advantages of such a narrative were reason 
enough for its success and enduring legacy. Yet its form was arguably 
as important as its content: this was, most of all, a seductive narrative, 
at home and abroad, because it was a life-affirming tragedy and drew 
a picture of a warm-hearted and peace-loving people.  
As my own research on Italian Holocaust films and their reception 
has shown, popular culture contributed to severing the link between 
the Italian persecution of its Jewry and the post-1943 deportation at 
the hands of the German occupying forces (Lichtner, 2008). This 
separation occurred as early as the end of the war, and was centred on 
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a twofold strategy: first, downplaying the application of the 1938 
racial laws and stressing the difference between Italy’s treatment of its 
Jewish population and Germany’s; second, noting the relatively lower 
percentage of Italian Jews murdered compared to that in other 
occupied countries. While the partiality of this reconstruction has now 
been exposed, its popular appeal, at home and abroad, was both 
significant and long-lived. An excellent example of its pervasiveness 
is provided by an interview Vittorio de Sica gave to a French 
journalist at the release of his 1970 adaptation of Giorgio Bassani’s Il 
giardino dei Finzi-Contini (1962): while his film was amongst the 
very few both to dwell on home-grown anti-Semitism and to 
acknowledge Italian involvement in the deportation of Jews, the 
director summarily denied any history of anti-Semitism in Italy, 
seemingly confirming what the French journalist already believed 
(Volmane, 1971). The contradiction between the film’s powerful 
indictment of Italy’s role in the persecution of the Jews and the 
general dismissal of this aspect of the film, not only by the press but 
even by the film’s director, proved that Italy’s self-acquittal had been 
so persuasive that persecution and protection had ceased to be 
incompatible. What Il giardino dei Finzi-Contini showed, amongst 
other things, was that the Holocaust in Italy had been a trauma of a 
minority, and that fascism and the world war had been national 
traumas to be treated with extreme sensitivity, if not ignored or 
actually repressed. The national post-war narrative has therefore been 
constructed on a series of binaries: an ‘institutional’ Italy and a ‘real’ 
one; a pre-1943 Italy and a post-1943 one; a pre-1938 fascism and a 
post-1938 one. Yet perhaps the most painful and sensitive internal 
dichotomy, the one between fascist and antifascist Italians, would take 
decades to be acknowledged in full. 
 
The revisionist trend 
 
One of the key cultural traits of Italy’s so-called Second Republic has 
been historical revisionism. In particular, the early years of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s rise to power were accompanied by fierce political 
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propaganda which masterfully combined elements of liberal, Catholic 
and neo-fascist anti-Communism. Berlusconi rode Reaganite rhetoric 
over the triumph of liberalism, exploited decades of Catholic scare-
mongering and harnessed the desire for revenge and recognition of a 
newly-legitimate neo-fascist right. It was the revenge of those who 
had been at the margins of the political discourse in post-war Italy, 
crushed by the presumed cultural and moral supremacy of the left: 
wheeling out now Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1993), 
now Courtois’ compendium of nasty reds (Courtois, 1999), 
Berlusconi’s political strategy was to revise the central role of anti-
fascism in the Italian Republic and the central role of Italian 
Communism in the anti-fascist effort. In this endeavour, Italy’s right 
found the unfailing aid of a left gripped in relentless introspection, a 
search for identity and modernity which often amounted to little more 
than self-flagellation, failing either to reclaim a dignified past or build 
a significant present, while relinquishing political initiative and 
authority along the way.  
Perhaps the chief event to recall in this context is Luciano 
Violante’s inauguration speech as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies 
on 10 May 1996 (Violante, 1996). His centre-left coalition had just 
won its first general election in convincing fashion and former 
communist politicians had been sworn in as ministers of internal 
affairs and justice, shattering once and for all the convention ad 
excludendum against the PCI that had characterised Italy since 1947. 
Perhaps inspired by the climate of intense expectation, Violante asked 
the nation to interrogate itself about the reasons that fifty years earlier 
had led thousands of young Italians, after Italy’s collapse and the 
armistice of 8 September 1943, to fight for the Republic of Salò 
(hence the name repubblichini), even when its cause was clearly 
doomed. While cautioning against conducting a wholesale revision of 
history or attributing moral equivalence to both sides, Violante called 
for an acknowledgment of those Italians as necessary to achieve a 
national reconciliation that had been prevented by the refusal to 
consider the war of liberation a civil war (Violante, 1996). A noble 
speech, it placed a new item on a political and cultural agenda of 
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which the left would almost immediately lose control. Thus the 
ultimate result of this introspection was not demystification and 
reconciliation, but rather the very mix of revisionism, slander and 
political apathy that Violante had wished to avoid. 
In this new cultural ferment, the first film to interpret the broader 
trend of historical reconsideration was Renzo Martinelli’s Porzûs 
(1997). Porzûs recounts the events surrounding the brutal murder of 
twenty non-Communist partisans of the Osoppo brigade at the hands 
of communist Resistance fighters in the Friuli 2 . The massacre of 
Porzûs needs to be understood in the context of the last months of the 
war in the north-east of Italy, where the civil war between fascists and 
anti-fascists was at its fiercest and where intra-Resistance tensions 
between communists and non-communist factions were exacerbated 
by the aggressive proximity of Tito’s Yugoslav forces. Given the 
intense confusion over the post-war fate of Trieste and the breakdown 
of relations between the Western Allies and the USSR, the massacre 
belongs as much to the realm of post-war politics as to that of the 
Italian war of liberation. On the one hand, the communists suspected 
the Catholic partisans of conspiring with the fascists against them; on 
the other hand, the Catholic partisans suspected the communists of 
plotting with Tito for a Yugoslav annexation of Trieste (Moder, 1997). 
In the minimal space that gloss and gore leave to analysis, 
Martinelli’s film is reasonably thorough in setting out these historical 
elements. And although his position is unmistakably anti-Communist 
– in particular by forcing the issue of the PCI’s responsibility in the 
massacre – what is most interesting in the context of this article is not 
the manipulative aspects of the filmic text as much as the reception it 
was accorded. As Martinelli himself protested in 2007, RAI bought 
the distribution rights to the film only to refuse either to screen it on 
television or to distribute it for the home video market, which it has 
only recently reached (Martinelli, 2007). Much as in the case of 
                                               
2
  The Osoppo formation, founded by local clergy in an effort to challenge Communist 
hegemony in the local resistance movement, included Catholic partisans, members of 
Ferruccio Parri’s social-democratic Partito d’Azione (Action Party) and monarchists 
(Fertilio, 1997).  
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Marcel Ophuls’s Le Chagrin et la pitié (The Sorrow and the Pity, 
1971) in its ten year wait for a French television broadcast – between 
1971 and 1981 – Porzûs appears to be the subject of a ‘censorship by 
inertia’ (Ophuls, 1971). RAI’s decision is inexplicable for a number of 
reasons: first, the film had succeeded in generating interest in the 
subject, including a one-page spread in the historic Communist Party 
daily newspaper L’Unità; second, even given the well-known 
politicisation of RAI, there have been sufficient changes in 
administration – of both RAI and the country – to exclude a party-
political boycott; third, this can hardly be a conspiracy of silence to 
prevent knowledge of the Porzûs massacre, because the event has 
been well-known for decades and indeed the subject of several trials 
since 1952, which convicted the communist partisans’ leader Mario 
Toffanin
3
. Rather, Porzûs might just be the least revisionist and the 
most partial of the ‘revisionist’ films of the last fifteen years. In other 
words, RAI, which traditionally has strived to achieve a compromise 
between majority and opposition, may struggle with the film’s militant 
but honest choice of subject. Instead, it appears to prefer films that 
adopt a seemingly more balanced political approach aimed at erasing 
the differences between the sides: a heart-warming but deadly 
embrace which is arguably much more misleading than outright 
propaganda. 
A chance to broadcast Porzûs came in 2005 when RAI prepared its 
programme to observe the first day of remembrance for the victims of 
the foibe. Strongly advocated by AN which had inherited the 
championing of this issue from the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), 
the Memorial Day was sanctioned by the Berlusconi government in 
2004 to commemorate those Italians who had been expelled from 
Yugoslavia and massacred by Tito’s partisans in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II. RAI commissioned for the occasion a new 
TV-movie, Il cuore nel pozzo, directed by Alberto Negrin. Negrin had 
already directed Perlasca: un eroe italiano, in 2001, demonstrating 
                                               
3
  Toffanin’s sentence was later commuted to ten years in prison, which he never carried out 
having previously absconded to Yugoslavia.  
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not only confidence with the television-movie format and an 
appropriate command of the historical genre but also a fine and all-
Italian political sensitivity, based on privileging the personal over the 
political and emotion and melodrama over ideology. Perlasca, in 
particular, was an ideal hero for Second Republic Italy: he was 
conservative and bourgeois, better still an official of the state, close to 
the fascist party during the regime and to the MSI later, but also a hero 
of untarnished credentials. Perlasca thus suited everyone, carrying the 
patriotic and political qualities in favour with the right but also the 
anti-fascist virtues inextricably linked with opposing the Holocaust. 
Moreover, his story allowed Italians once again to confront their role 
in the Holocaust from a partial and reassuring perspective where 
German brutality represented a familiar counterpoint. 
There was infinitely more potential for political debate in Il cuore 
nel pozzo. The film’s very subject matter was intensely political and 
controversial: Italy’s historical unwillingness to address it since 1945, 
had made the ethnic cleansing of Italians in Yugoslavia into a stalwart 
of the extreme right and now the right fully expected to gain political 
capital from its acknowledgment. The unease surrounding the foibe in 
post-war Italy amounted to more than just the PCI’s embarrassment in 
acknowledging the war crimes of their Yugoslav comrades and its 
own silence, at the time and later; for successive Italian governments, 
addressing the foibe would have meant dealing with the reasons for 
the presence of Italian civilians and military personnel in Yugoslavia 
in the first place, that is acknowledging Italian expansionism in the 
area, fascist ethnic policies in the north-east of Italy and in the 
occupied territories, and the brutality of Italian occupying troops, 
especially in anti-partisan warfare. These are exactly the elements that 
are lost in Negrin’s maudlin melodrama, which follows a child who 
witnesses the murder of his parents and is led to safety by a 
demobilised soldier and a priest. Whereas the quintessentially 
conservative characters were clearly chosen to maximise appeal with 
television audiences and please the authorities, the film stopped short 
of explicitly stressing the link between Yugoslav and Italian 
communists, thus angering the right, including Martinelli, who called 
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it a ‘missed opportunity’ (Martinelli, 2007). On the contrary, the film 
offered viewers a picture of anti-Italian persecution in isolation, rather 
than in the context of war, occupation and racial politics both in Italy 
and the Balkans. 
Nevertheless, the film suited its political sponsors: Maurizio 
Gasparri, AN deputy and Minister of Telecommunications in 2005, 
rose to the occasion, electing himself producer, critic and historian, 
and adopting a remarkable postmodernist approach in infusing the text 
with the required meanings. Trampling over protocol, which accords 
RAI at least the illusion of political autonomy, Gasparri issued 
invitations in his name to a RAI premiere of the film, to be hosted in 
the same Roman venue where AN were celebrating their tenth 
anniversary with some pomp. Then, faced with a loyal audience of 
comrades and the film’s embarrassed cast and crew, Gasparri regaled 
them with an impromptu stinging attack on historians guilty of 
downplaying the foibe (Fusani, 2005; Messina, 2005). 
Ousted from government in 2006, Gasparri was back in place, as 
co-ordinator of the Senators of Berlusconi’s new Popolo della Libertà 
party (PDL), two years later to oversee the launch of yet another 
revisionist fiction film. Michele Soavi’s Il sangue dei vinti, the partly 
RAI-funded adaptation of Gianpaolo Pansa’s controversial book on 
the repubblichini, was first submitted unsuccessfully to the Venice 
Film Festival, and then eventually shown, but only outside of the main 
competition, at Rome’s Festa del Cinema, before being briefly 
distributed in cinemas and then broadcast on television in May 2009. 
The film, a rather odd hybrid of melodrama, political exposé and 
murder-mystery, follows a policeman obsessed with solving the 
murder of a prostitute in Rome while his own family is torn apart by 
the civil war as his sister joins the repubblichini and his brother the 
Resistance. Atrocities and political fervour on both sides are resolved 
when the fascist girl rescues a partisan woman and her daughter  from 
the Germans: a scene which appears to exist only to qualify the 
morality of the fascist character, while simultaneously reminding the 
spectator that, nasty as the civil war was, neither side could be as bad 
as the Germans. The novelty in Soavi’s film, in the context of how 
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Italian cinema has traditionally represented World War II, might be 
that the Allied bombardments are shown not as the price of liberation 
but as the scars of occupation, in a sense equivalent to German 
atrocities. Indeed, the girl’s decision to join the repubblichini is 
brought about by her husband’s death in the San Lorenzo bombings in 
Rome, and not by fascist fervour or patriotic outrage at Italy’s 
capitulation. This is a significant point, because it can either be 
interpreted as a wholesale reassessment of the repubblichini 
motivation – they were not fascist after all – or as a scruple stopping 
the filmmakers from adopting a truly fascist heroine. Either way, Il 
sangue dei vinti’s ‘balanced’ approach seems to have left everyone 
unhappy: Pansa found the film’s adaptation of his book too loose; 
even Gasparri lamented its soft touch; the left criticised its refusal to 
draw a moral distinction between fascists and anti-fascists, or link 
anti-fascist violence against the repubblichini to two decades of 
oppression (Conti, 2008). 
Il sangue dei vinti is an apt example of the politicised confusion of 
the last fifteen years. The simultaneous collapse of the Cold War 
system of power internationally and the DC-PCI dualism in Italy 
brought about an understandable and in many ways necessary 
reconsideration of the events that led to the birth of Italy’s Republic. 
Yet this revision has been both partial and flawed: it has often 
descended into party-political point scoring and at the same time it has 
sought a compromising synthesis that does not suit historical analysis. 
In this process film has played its part and, interestingly, television, 
the most politicised of the visual mass media, and RAI – the most 
politically involved of the broadcasters in spite of Berlusconi’s 
ownership of Mediaset – has been the chosen battleground. The 
boundaries of what is representable have certainly shifted, yet 
arguably the political use of cinema and some of the representational 




Cinema and the representation of World War II in historical 
context 
 
The role of film, through cinema and later television, in the 
construction and dissemination of Italy’s wartime dates back to the 
war itself. In the immediate aftermath of the war, film contributed to 
reinforce a reassuring vision of Italianness, a vision that has been 
political in all its nuances. Many neo-realist films responded to the 
euphoria of the anti-fascist Resistance and the challenges of its post-
war evolution by offering a unifying narrative, which necessarily 
depended on the downplaying both of the fascist regime’s popularity 
and of its seriousness. Hence, the greater part of the neo-realist films 
that dealt with the war adopted a set of narrative strategies which 
success turned into nothing short of a five-part doctrine. First, a 
concentration on the period after 8 September 1943, and specifically 
on the last months of the war; second, the representation of Italian 
fascists as figures of ridicule; third, the use of this image as a 
counterpoint to one of Germans as monsters; fourth, the 
overestimation of popular support for the Resistance to the point of 
assuming it; and fifth, the heavy symbolic use of children, either in 
central or supporting roles, in order to define the actions of adults and 
reinforce all of the above points, as well as to provide a degree of 
hope and an uplifting ending.  
Roma città aperta (1945) is the most obvious and arguably the 
most accomplished example of the trends outlined above. Set in the 
months before the liberation of Rome, when Nazi-fascist occupation 
was at its most repressive and most pointless, Rossellini’s film 
portrayed the Germans as brutal, ruthless, and also as immoral, for 
example using homosexuality to characterise negatively both main 
German characters. Their Italian allies, on the contrary, came from a 
social undergrowth of misfits, opportunists, greedy and cowardly men, 
and shallow, lost women. The men were ugly, excessively tall, short 
or fat, branded with misshapen features and unpleasant voices. The 
Roman population, with hardly any exception, formed a wholesome 
counterpoint made of atavistic humanism, Catholic values expressed 
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not through piety but through action and old-fashioned, working-class 
common sense. Their children were their conscience: brave, reckless 
and above all innocent, their presence provides salvation and their 
actions the redemption of a nation. There was little sign of the crowds 
that had cheered Mussolini and thrived or survived by his 
government’s long rule. 
Yet Roma città aperta is also arguably the best example of that 
magnificent urgency which allowed early neo-realism to accompany a 
somewhat sanitised version of the immediate past with a contagious 
spontaneity, hope matched by expectation, spurring people to action, 
demanding social justice, providing the synthesis of resistance and 
revolution. In those dramatic years, it was perhaps necessary for the 
nation’s self-representation to be more inspiring than realistic, and in 
that representation we should see not only a collective self-acquittal 
but also a significant contribution to the psychological and moral 
reconstruction of the nation. 
Both the urgency and the hope had gone by 1959, when two films, 
Mario Monicelli’s La grande guerra and Roberto Rossellini’s Il 
Generale della Rovere, won ex-aequo the Venice Film Festival, 
heralding a new wave of films that attempted to reclaim the subject 
matters and the aesthetic values of neo-realism. Forty-two films about 
World War II were made between 1959 and 1962. Unlike the films of 
the immediate post-war period, these enjoyed reasonable success but 
had little to offer, for the most part, both aesthetically and politically. 
While generally retaining the glorification of the anti-fascist struggle 
that was typical of neorealism, films of this era were sufficiently 
removed from the event to offer audiences a cosier and more inclusive 
anti-fascism, using comedic tropes more readily than neorealist films 
had done, and for the most part shunning tragedy. 
The choice of leading characters best epitomises the difference 
between neo-realist films and their rather faded relations of the early 
1960s. In the late 1940s these had been communist intellectuals, 
priests and working class women and men in whom the qualities of 
the previous two categories often found something of a synthesis. 
Between 1959 and 1962, instead, Italian war films focused on lower 
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middle class leading characters with no political and ideological 
affiliation or, as in the case of Luciano Salce’s Il Federale (1962), 
allegiances so heavily caricatured as to be pathetic and ultimately void 
of significance. Clueless fascists and accidental anti-fascists: this was 
wartime politics at the time of the economic miracle, aimed not at 
introspection and even partial re-elaboration, but at a numbing and 
undemanding entertainment. Yet, even so, these films were more 
worthy of critical attention than its contemporaries felt: in particular, 
their political and ideological ambiguity deserved attention, as their 
apparent apathy was not always real and was in any case always 
political.  Critic Lino Miccichè dismissed Il Federale as “a chapter 
amongst the most degraded of the comical branch of films on fascism, 
where an abundance of mockeries evenly and generously distributed 
result in a sort of victimistic brotherhood of Italiani brava gente, 
whether wearing a black shirt or a bourgeois’ suit and tie” (Miccichè, 
1995). Yet Salce’s film epitomises a sort of engagé apathy, its 
qualunquismo
4
, lamented by Miccichè, clearly hid a number of 
thoughtful political insights, such as in the very final scene when the 
fascist character, having been saved from a lynch mob and made a 
seamless transition from fascist to bourgeois uniform, throws away in 
disgust the cigarettes offered him by American soldiers. Here, then, is 
a political statement both on the broken promises of the past and on 
the hollow rewards of the present which calls for a wider political 
reconsideration of all these works, even if their distant relationship 
with the neorealist model makes them seem shallow and often 
mediocre. 
What neither early nor late neo-realism had carried out was a 
proper investigation into the origins and popularity of fascism. This 
was a subject that undoubtedly existed in private memory, but could 
not be reconciled with the public demand to move on from the war. 
                                               
4
  The word qualunquismo derives from the right-wing political formation L’Uomo Qualunque 
(the ordinary man), which in the first Republican elections of 1948 sought to interpret the 
legacy of fascism, providing political representation to all those whose nostalgia could no 
longer be expressed in the public arena. The word has since expressed, better than any 
translation, a critical disinterest in politics comprising populist and anti-democratic elements.  
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Thus a critical gaze at pre-war fascist Italy was only attempted after 
1968, as part of the broader generational challenge of almost every 
aspect of Italy’s society and culture. The sessantottini were just as 
keen to question their parents’ past as their counterparts in France and 
West Germany, and fascism was the previous generation’s original sin. 
However, while the narratives constructed by the protesters rejected 
much of their parents’ interpretation of the past, the Italians did 
salvage the experience of the Resistance, which they incorporated into 
their political identity just as many of their parents had done after the 
war, whether they had participated in it or not. Thus, unlike in France, 
the spotlight on the wartime past, merciless though it often was, failed, 
in particular, to dismiss permanently the central myth of italiani brava 
gente. 
The challenge was nevertheless significant, the critique often fierce 
and the analysis sharp. In Italy, this was the era of political filmmakers 
and many turned their gaze directly or indirectly towards the fascist 
period, its origins and legacy. Amongst these, Bertolucci’s trilogy on 
fascism, Strategia del ragno (1970), Il Conformista (1970), and 1900 
(1974), best demonstrates the insights and arguments of the period, as 
well as some of the key concerns and tropes used to re-represent a 
recent past that many in Italy had already began to consider ancient. 
Bertolucci’s films shared with others, such as Pier Paolo Pasolini’s 
Salò, o le 120 Giornate di Sodoma or Liliana Cavani’s The Night 
Porter, an interest in the psychological roots and consequences of 
totalitarian regimes, which was the staple diet of 1970s intellectuals. 
But Bertolucci matched his fascination with psychoanalysis with an 
interest in the practice of politics, both of the ventennio and of post-
war Italy, including the delicate issue of memory, and amnesia, of the 
past. Memorable scenes such as the Church marriage of black shirts 
and bourgeois interests in 1900, or Clerici’s cleansing in a rejoicing 
nationalist-communist crowd in Il Conformista, encapsulated that 
priceless cinematic ability to comment simultaneously on the past and 
the present – and  the relationship between the two. 
Returning then to where we started, to contemporary films about 
fascism, it seems evident even from such a brief and partial overview, 
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that Italian cinema has intervened in political and historical debates 
around fascism and World War II ever since 1945, all the while 
contributing to form popular attitudes towards the past, by providing 
both dominant narratives and counter-narratives. This point, though 
hardly groundbreaking, needs nevertheless to be made if we are to 
guard against the offhand dismissal of the more recent films as 
revisionist drivel and argue for their rigorous academic consideration 
within the context of cinema’s intervention in the public historical 
discourse. Given the natural fluctuations of commercial and cultural 
trends, this intervention has remained a constant, even though its form 
and content have changed radically. 
 
(Partial) truths and reconciliation 
 
Perhaps the crucial question here is in fact how much the content has 
changed or, more specifically, which parts of the content have 
changed, focussing on a qualitative, rather than quantitative analysis 
of this change. As discussed earlier, new stories are being told, some 
subjects have gained public legitimacy which had before been 
relegated to the private sphere and some previously ignored 
perspectives have been reclaimed, although it remains to be 
established quite how these new stories relate to the ‘voiceless’ they 
claim to give voice to, whether they achieve this or not, and how 
much instead the voiceless are used here simply to increase the 
volume of contemporary political debates. This aside, if it is clear that 
contemporary films represent a deep reassessment of the fascist period 
it is also evident that this reassessment is partial.  
As the purpose of this article is not to answer these questions, but 
rather to outline them and to argue the need both to raise and answer 
them exhaustively, it will suffice here to point out a few key aspects of 
the representation of fascism and World War II which appear little 
changed. First, contemporary so-called ‘revisionist’ films still ignore 
pre-war fascism, focusing mostly on the war. This belies any claim 
that these films answer a contemporary right-wing desire to revisit 
fascism, although it does not necessarily mean that such an attempt is 
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not taking place more subtly and through other media. In fact, the 
fascist government’s choice to ally itself with Hitler and enter World 
War II remains widely seen as the beginning of its decline in 
popularity and as its worst mistake. From a neo-fascist political 
perspective, focussing on pre-war fascism would create space for an 
assertion of its popularity and, with an amount of imagination and 
manipulation by no means unusual in films, allow the celebration of 
its ambitions and few successes. Why would those inclined to reclaim 
Mussolini’s statesmanship, as we all too often hear is now the case, 
concentrate on his demise? 
But of course narrating wartime stories does not mean analysing 
critically, or even dispassionately, Italy’s decision to enter the war, let 
alone its conduct in it. In fact, much as Italian films on this subject 
have always done, the ‘revisionist films’ focus exclusively on the 
period after September 1943: indeed, Porzûs, Un cuore nel pozzo and 
Il sangue dei vinti are all set during the last few months of the war. In 
other words there is no sign here of Italy’s war: the attack on France in 
1940; the botched invasion of Greece; the disastrous deserts of North 
Africa; the Russian debacle. Or rather, the signs are selective: of 
Greece we might see the post-armistice German massacre of Italian 
soldiers in Cephalonia; of the African campaigns, by far the most 
represented aspect is the defeat at El Alamein; of the invasion of the 
USSR, the names of the missing, or at best exhausted, veterans5;  of 
the Balkan occupation we now see the tame and tragic end; and while 
the persecution of Italy’s Jews is ever-present, it took cinema until 
1970 to mention the 1938 Racial Laws, which sanctioned institutional 
anti-Semitism and the persecution of Italy’s Jews. Hence, historically 
Italian cinema has ignored Italy’s role in oppressing foreign 
populations and domestic minorities, while it has offered and still 
                                               
5
  See for example Gabriele Salvatores’s Mediterraneo (1991), I giorni dell’amore e dell’odio 
(Claver Salizzato, 2001) and RAI’s 2005 historical fiction film Cefalonia (Riccardo Milani) 
for Greece; El Alamein: la linea del fuoco (Enzo Monteleone, 2002) and Le rose del deserto 
(Mario Monicelli, 2006) as far as Africa is concerned; on the Russian campaign see 
Giuseppe de Santis’s 1962 Italiani brava gente and reference to missing veterans in, for 
example, Pasqualino Settebellezze (Lina Wertmuller, 1974) and Nuovo Cinema Paradiso 
(Giuseppe Tornatore, 1988). 
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offers plenty of examples of Italian victimisation. All of these 
narrative strategies seem to point to an overall design, to represent 
Italy as victim rather than aggressor, which is consistent with the self-
portrait Italians have seen on screen since 1945. 
Not only, then, have Italian films always commented on history 
and used history for contemporary political purposes, but the latest 
films associated with the resurgence of a right-wing history present a 
number of narrative and representational tropes which are consonant 
with traditional representations of fascism and WWII. While in some 
ways undoubtedly antithetic to more orthodox, resistance-centred 
narratives, the films of the 21st century share a common denominator 
with many earlier examples: the myth of italiani brava gente. In 
academic circles it is now a given that the stereotype of the good 
Italian is indeed just a myth, even if its health seems to be steady with 
public opinion. In 1971, when The Sorrow and the Pity was first 
released, shattering the Gaullist orthodoxy of 40-million résistants, 
Simone Veil lamented the replacement of one myth with another one, 
of 40-million collaborators (Le Monde, 1981)
6
. It is not my intention 
here to contribute to a similar operation. This paper is not concerned 
with the accuracy, or the degree of accuracy, of these myths, but 
rather with how their longevity affects the representation of history 
and the political discourses constructed around it. In the first instance, 
persisting in representing Italians as unfailingly decent prevents any 
honest analysis of the past. This is an aspect that should interest the 
right as much as the left of the political arena: the left should trust that 
such an analysis would reveal the righteousness of anti-fascism in all 
its forms, if not in each of its actions; the right should strive for such 
an analysis so as to strip the civil war of its mythology and thus 
reclaim the legitimacy not of those who were defeated, but of those 
who were wrong. How can one revise history without first freeing any 
representation from the need to show all Italians as people 
fundamentally alien to evil? 
                                               
6
  Simone Veil, interviewed by Europe1 radio station; reported in Le Monde, 30 October 1981. 
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The makers of Porzûs, Il sangue dei vinti and their contemporaries 
could, therefore, simply be incompetent revisionists. Or they could be 
partial revisionists: not only because they revisit only parts of the 
history of those years, nor only because their revisionism is close to 
and openly sponsored by one political side, but also because historical 
revisionism is only a part of their purpose. There are in fact other 
consequences of the italiani brava gente myth as espoused in recent 
years. On the one hand, there is the unconditional and unstained 
version of the myth, such as in Il cuore nel pozzo, that represents an 
unflinchingly moral and victimised population. This stereotype is 
uplifting and anaesthetic, perfect for an evening in front of the 
television, subtly putting across certain political points – communist 
crimes, patriotic suffering – without otherwise causing any serious or 
potentially destabilising political consideration. On the other hand, 
there is the dark and ambiguous, would-be edgier version of the same 
myth, such as the one Il sangue dei vinti seems to offer, that 
accompanies good with evil, more or less evenly distributed, and thus 
suggests that everyone is the same. While the same topics dear to the 
right are raised here too, often less subtly, this only apparently more 
honest version of the stereotype reinforces and historicises 
contemporary apathy towards politics, feeding a disillusionment 
which is the antithesis of democracy. Not thinking about politics or 
thinking all political sides are the same, effectively obtains the same 
result: to prevent analysis and maintain the status quo. The danger in 
these films, therefore, might not be the re-writing of history but its 
erasure, a political operation which translates present indifference 
towards politics into the past, effectively replacing any political or 
moral rationale with the illogical logic of reality television. From the 
blurring of differences and the decontextualisation of the past, only 
one side stands to gain. 
The fact that Porzûs, the least conciliatory of the ‘revisionist’ films, 
lay dormant in a RAI archive for many years may well be a case in 
point, although undoubtedly these considerations need further 
investigation and more solid proof. Indeed their aim is, at least in part, 
to argue for such a need. By way of opening up the debate on the 
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representation and popular perceptions of fascist Italy, this article has 
attempted to prove that the orthodox-revisionist debate has little to 
offer. It is a fatally flawed defence mechanism: its roots are deluded, 
its premise simplistic and its results counter-productive. First of all, if 
the ‘revisionist’ films really are part of a wider right-wing campaign 
to rewrite history and deprive the left of its anti-fascist roots, all the 
while harming both the roots and the branches, then simply to dismiss 
these films is likely to be as successful a strategy as the opposition’s 
withdrawal from the Chamber of Deputies in the aftermath of the 
1924 Matteotti murder7: soon the revisionist will be the orthodox and 
the orthodox popular only in France. Secondly, this dismissal refuses 
to acknowledge that some revision may indeed be necessary and, at 
the same time, to realise that these films do not actually revise that 
much. Moving from this basic misunderstanding, the consequent 
analysis of these films and their aims will lead to an inappropriate 
response. Third, exclusively to dismiss or ridicule films that command 
good audience response runs the risk of lending support to the chief 
premise of the revisionist camp: that the history of the war was 
hijacked by the winners and that political, academic and cultural 
guardians of that history have ever since protected it at the expense of 
all alternative voices. 
There are instead far more significant questions that contemporary 
revisionism begs us to ask and that only a serious and detached 
consideration of the phenomenon can help us answer. One question is 
undoubtedly about the politics of the memory of the civil war. ‘The 
right’, even as I have been hurriedly referring to it throughout this 
article, is a rather broad and complex church, perhaps especially in 
Italy and even more so since the formation, in 2008, of the PDL, 
which merged Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the post-fascist AN, thus 
                                               
7
  The fascist murder of Socialist MP Giacomo Matteotti in 1924 signalled a shift in the fascist 
control of Italy’s government. In January 1925 Mussolini defiantly spoke to Parliament 
accepting political responsibility for the crime, but his leadership was not challenged paving 
the way for twenty years of fascist dictatorship.  
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including both fascist apologists and liberals with anti-fascist roots8. It 
would therefore be simplistic to presume that a political party is 
behind the revision of the history of the Civil War. Indeed, Maurizio 
Gasparri sponsored both Il cuore nel pozzo and Il sangue dei vinti: the 
latter displeased him but it was still broadcast. Moreover, it is not 
clear whether this political patronage was limited to the films’ 
marketing or extended to their programming and production in the 
same way that appears to have characterised Barbarossa (2010), 
RAI’s epic rendition of Alberto da Giussano sponsored by the Lega 
Nord and solicited directly on their behalf by Prime Minister 
Berlusconi in a now infamous phone-call with Rai Fiction director 
Agostino Saccà (Lillo, 2007). And why is Porzûs still not shown on 
TV? At play here there are undoubtedly some considerations that are 
historical in nature, namely the post-fascists attempting to settle old 
scores and substantiate an identitarian equality, and others that are 
presentist, such as  the attempt to reiterate an anti-communist rhetoric 
that is ever-successful albeit orphaned of the Soviet scarecrow (or 
indeed of actual communists). These aims are akin and yet a tension 
must exist between them, as the latter only needs to discredit the 
communists without necessarily tarnishing the role of the Resistance 
or indeed re-evaluating the other side. The assessment of this tension, 
and with it the complexities of the memories of the Civil War, must 
pass through an acknowledgment of the plurality of these memories, 
and of their evolution, even within the anti-fascist orthodoxy. 
The second key question must be about the meanings that 
reconciliation takes on in this specific Italian context. It is interesting 
to see Soavi refer to Il sangue dei vinti as an attempt to reconcile the 
two sides (Stefanutto Rosa, 2009). Was the ‘civic religion of the 
Resistance’ not also a way in part to heal wounds, or at least to 
prevent them from reopening (Gundle, 2000:113)? Ignoring the 
fascists’ point of view, playing down their numbers and their brutality 
                                               
8
  Indeed, at the time of writing Berlusconi has expelled Gianfranco Fini’s AN veterans: while 
the ‘post-fascist’ latter goes to any length to condemn Mussolini’s ideology, the allegedly 
liberal former liberally quotes the old dictator. 
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was also a way of allowing their quiet reintroduction into the social 
fabric without interfering with private memories, as demonstrated by 
their rapid and assured resurfacing. That was a reconciliation based on 
silences; could contemporary revisionism really be an attempt to heal 
a fractious past by shattering the silence and thus according the 
defeated the dignity denied them? Soavi’s words notwithstanding, this 
revision is itself too fractious to be a believable attempt at 
reconciliation, let alone bring it about. There is too little truth in this 
catharsis, too little assumption of responsibility. If it is an attempt to 
reconcile adversaries, it is one based on the erasure of all differences 
between them. It is flawed and if it is not utterly doomed to failure it is 




The task set here is ambitious but its accomplishment will help us 
redefine the relationship between Italian cinema and perhaps the most 
traumatic aspect of the country’s history. One aspect of this 
relationship concerns the popular perceptions of history: how does 
film act both as site of memory (Nora, 1984-1992) for those who 
experienced the events in question and as a site for the construction of 
memory for those who require one. The other aspect is more strictly 
presentist, and concerns the political use of history: how does a 
specific representation of history interact with and influence the 
public’s response to the political context of their time? These 
questions reflect what I have elsewhere described as the double 
historicity of film, that is its ability to comment on both the period a 
film represents and the period in which it was made, and thus also on 
how the latter interacts with the former (Lichtner:9-11). 
The successful answer to these questions depends on three 
fundamental processes: first, an examination that is historical, that is 
not centred only on key films but on broader representational trends, 
highlighting those aspects of representation that have changed over 
time alongside those that have remained constant; second, an approach 
that is both text-based and audience-based, carrying out simultaneous 
 
28 
analyses of films and of their reception; third, the thorough 
contextualisation of both the film and its reception within the politics 
and general climate of the time of the film’s release. The reward is an 
insight into how film both reflects and affects how Italians have 
related to their country’s fascist past and the fratricidal conflict in 
which it culminated, how their relationship with the anti-fascist values 
of post-war Italy has evolved and their significance today. 
While it has criticised the effectiveness of the unconditional 
defence of an orthodox, Resistance-centric historical narrative against 
revisionist attempts, what this article has not advocated is a relativist 
comparison of opposing representative trends or the search for an 
unhappy medium between them. Rather, it has made a case for a 
longue-durée reconsideration of how Italian cinema has represented 
fascism and World War II in Italy, arguing that such a reassessment 
will add to our understanding of the contested memories of this period 
and of the narratives employed to remember it. This reassessment 
must take into account not only the exploitative and selective 
revisionism of recent years, but also the silences, the simplifications 
both deliberate and accidental, and the distortions of Italy’s history on 
which post-war Italy’s pacification has been constructed. If it indeed 
achieves this, it will not be a reassessment, as I have called it, but an 
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